

OFFICE OF THE DDI

file Narcotics

September 19, 1975

Dupe of DOJ-54-1 RIF by DOJ - ER&L - BN - 5/30/2007

TO : ADDI

FROM : DDI/CINM

SUBJECT: Narcotics--Inter-Agency Meetings

Attached for your information are reports from recent meetings of the Inter-American (ARA), NEA, and East Asia Inter-Agency Narcotics Control Working Groups. The DDI was represented at the first two meetings, and the NARCOG was represented at the East Asia session. These meetings were called specifically to review the draft Narcotics Control Action Plans (NCAPs) submitted by the various missions. The chairmen wanted to review all of the draft NCAPs prior to the annual regional meetings that are currently being held.

You will note that Colombia was highlighted in the ARA meeting and received rather high marks for effort. In the

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DOJ Review

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State Dept. review

OFFICE OF THE D/I

SUBJECT: Narcotics--Inter-Agency Meetings

You will note there is growing concern, both in Washington and in the mission, that significant amounts of legal opium in India may be leaking into illicit channels. There is an acknowledged lack of solid intelligence on the Indian opium situation, and a greater intelligence effort was recommended.

The East Asia Working Group concentrated on the proposed NCAP for Burma, which is part of the overall Golden Triangle picture. The use of herbicides is now being considered for possible use as a control weapon against the illicit growth of opium poppy in Burma, where some 100,000 acres are grown annually, providing the Burmese Government will approve and support such a program. Although there are inherent problems in the widespread use of herbicides for poppy eradication, the potential gain may be worth the risk. But this is a policy, rather than an intelligence matter, and, therefore, does not directly affect CIA. If herbicides are used effectively in Burma, however, it might encourage Mexico to use them in its extensive and costly eradication effort.

cc: D/OCI


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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520



September 9, 1975

TO: S/NM - Ambassador Vance

FROM: NEA/RA - Richard C. Searing
Narcotics Coordinator *RC*

SUBJECT: NEA NCAP Review

A meeting was called on Thursday, August 28 to review the NCAP submissions from the various NEA posts prior to the NEA Narcotics Conference in Islamabad. Representatives from State, AID, DEA (only one), Customs, Treasury, CIA and OMB attended.

For the most part there was little questioning of the overall programs from those posts from which we had received submissions at the time of the meeting (we have not yet received submissions from Beirut, Cairo, or Algiers). In fact the group concurred in sending a commendation to one of the posts (Kathmandu) for a job well done.

PAKISTAN

1. Not surprisingly, the greatest time was spent on the NCAP for Pakistan. The post recommends moving forward on the crop substitution project in the Swabi Tehsil and proposes obligation of \$2 million in the fifth quarter of FY 1976 and an additional \$1 million in FY 1977. The post also proposes obligation of \$800,000 for 15 additional FIU's and related enforcement activities in FY 1977. The group recommended that you accept this proposal by the post at least for planning purposes pending review thereof during your visit at the post.

-2-

2. When discussing the crop substitution project with the Mission, the group recommends that the Mission and the GOP be urged to formulate the project so as to maximize the linkage between progress on crop substitution and GOP regulation and control efforts. The group also recommends that the Mission be urged to follow up GOP plans to encourage IBRD and ADB interest in financing general development programs in the area of our crop substitution project.

3. Questions were raised over the fact that Pakistani authorities apparently have not issued licenses for the opium crop being planted this year although the crop is being planted. This gives rise to real doubts concerning the intentions of the Pakistanis to control this production.

4. Because other countries are affected by illegal export of opium from Pakistan, it was suggested that an effort be made to interest the countries concerned to bring pressure on the Pakistanis to make greater efforts to control such activity. There was some disagreement within the group as to the best means of accomplishing such cooperation. Some felt the Embassy should take the lead in setting up a formal committee of representatives from other embassies to work out a program along these lines. Others felt a more informal arrangement (unspecified) might be more appropriate or that we might find it best to work through UNFDAC, perhaps working with the UN Resident Representative. It was finally agreed that this matter would best be settled on the scene in direct conversation with the Embassy.

5. A discussion of the agricultural research program being carried on by the U.S. Department of Agriculture in Pakistan was stymied by the fact that no representative of USDA was present. We were unable to determine whether USDA plans to finance these continuing programs out of its own funds or expected to use CCINC funds.

Action Required:

That USDA be contacted by S/NM in order to determine the answer to the question raised above.

-3-

6. The group generally felt that the portion of the Pakistan NCAP devoted to training was somewhat confusing. The group feels that training programs for the Pakistanis should be aimed at training instructors in order to enable the Paks themselves to take over this job in the not-too-distant future.

7. The group strongly supported the Embassy's intention to evaluate the use of equipment already provided before requesting more. It was suggested that people at the Washington end could usefully contribute to such an evaluation.

8. As a part of the review mentioned above, it was suggested that we should require the Paks to train additions to their narcotics staffs in the use of equipment already provided before new equipment is given to them.

9. The group noted that the NCAP figures on narcotics manpower as supplied by the Embassy took into account only American manpower. Figures on Pak manpower also are needed.

Action Required:

NEA/PAB should ask the Embassy to supply the additional information.

10. The Paks have requested a special training program for an official from Punjab province who is responsible for overseeing the storage, distribution and sales of

licit narcotics and dangerous drugs. Through oversight, this was not discussed during the NCAP review.

Action Taken:

We have informed the Embassy that we agree in principle to provide the requested training and have asked the Mission to supply biographic data.

AFGHANISTAN

1. There were few comments on the NCAP for Afghanistan. The group felt there was perhaps too much emphasis in the proposed information program on drug addiction as an American problem. More play should be given in any such program to the international aspects of the problem.

Action Required:

This point should be discussed with representatives from Embassy Kabul. Inasmuch as the NEA Narcotics Coordinator plans to visit Kabul following the Islamabad Conference, he will undertake this assignment.

2. It was generally felt that the Government of Iran could be materially helpful in moving the Afghans to greater effort in drug enforcement. The Iran Desk Officer felt, however, that it was unlikely that any effort in this direction on our part would prove fruitful.

Action Required:

This matter should be discussed with the representatives of Embassy Tehran at the Conference.

3. The group felt that the best route to follow in Afghanistan was through UNFDAC. It was felt in particular that the German police adviser should be retained and that we should make every effort to encourage the German government to agree to his extension.

Action Required:

That S/NM discuss the UNFDAC program in Geneva and with the Germans.

IRAN

Everyone agreed that the Iran program is not moving forward very well, but the group was unable to come up with any constructive suggestions as to how to make progress. The group agreed that further discussions on this subject should be held both during the Islamabad Conference and following your trip to Tehran.

Action Requested: That S/NM discuss the problems of the Iran program with the Embassy in Tehran and that further discussions be held here in Washington following your return.

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-6-

Action Required:

That NEA/ARN send a cable to Embassy Amman setting forth the problem and asking the Embassy to suggest actions that might be possible to solve it.

EGYPT

Although an NCAP has not been received from Cairo, it was generally agreed by the group that cooperation with the Egyptian authorities has shown a commendable increase. They have indicated an interest in training programs both here and in Egypt and the group believes that every effort should be made by us to be as forthcoming as possible in this direction. This is now being carried out and several grants have been approved for such training.

INDIA

Given the stress in the Indian NCAP on the possibility that the illegal export of the legal poppy crop is growing and that there is a lack of solid intelligence on this point, the group believes DEA should be encouraged to increase its intelligence capability in India.

ALGERIA, MOROCCO, TUNISIA

In all three of these North African countries, the NCAPs stressed rather ambitious training programs. The group, while commending the idea of training programs, felt the NCAP proposals were perhaps too ambitious given our limited interest and capability in these countries. It was recommended that a program should certainly continue but on a more modest scale. The group was particularly impressed by the argument of the Algerian Desk Officer that our program in that country was one of the few avenues the Embassy can use to obtain direct access to the government. It was also felt that given the nature of the drug traffic patterns in Morocco, that it might be possible to interest European countries in bringing more pressure on the Moroccans to control this traffic.

Action Required:

That the EUR Conference in Paris discuss the possibility of interesting their respective governments to take action which would put pressure on the Moroccans in this area.

Clearances and cc:

S/NM:JMcLaughlin
DEA/IGIN:PSFotopoulos
CUSTOMS:FKeenan
AID/NESA/ME:WHFaulkner
AID/NESA/ME:KHTeil
AID:MWampler
S/NM:DCohen
S/NM:CBuck
TREASURY:MBach
NEA/PAB:MAustrian
M/MED:FKJohnson
A/BF/OB:MCRadnot
AID/NESA/NENA:SBowens
AID/NESA/SA/P:GTMcCloskey
AID/NESA/NENA-TUNISIA:JNBrooks
CIA/OCI/MEA:
OMB:MPerky

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9 September 1975

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Meeting of the ARA Interagency Working Group
on International Narcotics Control

1. The Inter-American (ARA) International Narcotics Control Committee met on September 8 under the Chairmanship of George Brown, the regional coordinator. The meeting was called to review the proposed Narcotics Control Action Plans of Curacao, Barbados, Colombia, Jamaica, and Paraguay for FY-77. The meeting was attended by representatives from the Department of State, DEA, OMB, AID, USIA, Customs, Treasury, CIA, and the Office of the Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State for Narcotics Matters.

2. Chairman Brown opened the meeting with some general notes about the ARA Narcotics conference in Caracas on November 5 and 6. He solicited comments on the proposed agenda and asked for an estimate of the number of Washington attendees. He hopes to keep the number of Washington participants to a minimum due to the embassy's fairly limited conference room accommodations.

3. The Curacao and Barbados NCAPs were approved with a minimum of discussion. Both programs are small, consisting mainly of training for the local police.

4. Deputy Assistant Secretary Williams Luers joined the meeting for the discussion of the Colombian program and made some general remarks about the narcotics situation in Colombia. He said that he is generally pleased with the way things are going there. The government is giving narcotics sufficient priority and appears to be more honest than most in Latin America. The major problem with Colombia is its geography and the variety of narcotics enforcement agencies and their lack of coordination.

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

5. The Bogota Embassy narcotics coordinator traveled to Washington for the meeting and presented the embassy's program in detail to the committee members. Several points on training programs, equipment deliveries, and financial aid were clarified and some minor changes in these areas were made. The Embassy coordinator noted that corruption is prevalent on a large scale at lower levels. He said that extradition is a major problem, as it is in all of Latin America. It was noted that President Lopez would be coming to Washington for a state visit at the end of this month and that narcotics is on the agenda for the meeting with President Ford.

6. After much discussion, the Colombian NCAP was approved in total with only minor changes.

7. Due to the length of the meeting, I was not able to remain for the discussions on the Jamaican or Paraguayan action plans.



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ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

09 September 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


SUBJECT: Discussion of Burma Narcotics Control Program (NCAP) by East Asia Interagency Working Group on Drug Control, 05 September 1975

1. The undersigned attended a meeting of the Interagency Working Group specifically arranged to discuss and approve, where possible, the NCAP for Burma, submitted in early August. Present were the usual members from State, DEA, Customs, AID, etc. The meeting was chaired by Mr. William Gallagher, State's EA referent for narcotics.

2. The first item discussed, following some general comments on the submission of the Rangoon Embassy, was herbicides. Although it is U.S. policy not to get involved with herbicides, according to one of the participants, Ambassador Vance has reportedly said he is willing to consider Burma as an exception to this rule. It was agreed that, if the Burmese Government were willing to use herbicides on the approximately 100,000 acres of poppies planted annually there (and it is uncertain what Burma wishes to do in this area!), that they should foot the bill (because of Congressional problems) which could cost in the neighborhood of \$100-800,000.

3. Mr. Standifer from the DEA enforcement side next broached the matter of inserting two Agents into the NCAP for the coming fiscal year. He was immediately set upon by the others around the table, including his colleague from the intelligence side of DEA. This portion of the discussion ended with the conclusion that not much chance existed for a DEA presence in Rangoon in the near future.

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SUBJECT: Discussion of Burma Narcotics Control Program
(NCAP) by East Asia Interagency Working
Group on Drug Control, 05 September 1975
Page 2

4. The F-27 aircraft came up at this point, including the various requests pertaining to the aircraft. It will cost about \$750,000 and the radio equipment, propellers and automatic pilot requested were also approved. The 532 type engines were not because of a two-year lead time involved. A heated discussion took place over the Burmese request for a civilian configuration of the plane and it was finally decided to recommend a troop (ie. military) configuration, unless the Embassy comes up with compelling reasons not to. The night vision devices were approved to the tune of \$450,000.

5. The next subject, helicopters, was discussed for most of the remainder of the meeting. An acrimonious exchange revealing strong differences of opinion on this matter surfaced. The Embassy recommended in their submission that twelve (12) additional choppers be approved for FY-76. The main bone of contention was whether six or 12 should be approved prior to January 1976, or until the Burmese has proven that they intended to use the helicopters against narcotics-related targets. (Note: During the exchange the undersigned was asked for CIA's feelings on the use of the helicopters by the Burmese military. The reply was that all indications to date are that they appear willing to use them against narcotics targets; it was doubted that any long-range plans would ever be forthcoming from the Burmese, but on an ad hoc or target of opportunity basis, based on discussions so far, we felt they would use them as intended.)

6. Following a description by an AID official on the uses of Type 205 helicopters (what the Burmese have now) and type 206 (lighter, mainly used for herbicides), it was decided the 205's should suffice, since they can both ferry troops and be used for herbicides (with a few problems involved); however, the Group was willing to entertain a request for any mix that the Burmese might wish to submit.

SUBJECT: Discussion of Burma Narcotics Control Program
(NCAP) by East Asia Interagency Working
Group on Drug Control, 05 September 1975
Page 3

7. The big debate on helicopters got sidetracked for several minutes on spare parts. The Embassy did not include it in their submission and another heated argument developed. After weighing the pros and cons it was agreed that \$450,000 should be included (12 helicopters) in the NCAP. A contract would have to be set up with Bell Aircraft and a slot would probably have to be set up either at Singapore (where Bell has a storage depot) or Rangoon to watch over the program. The main reason this item was approved is that most members thought it would assist the Embassy to gain some leverage over the Burmese to work actively against narcotics targets.

8. Back to the 12 versus six discussion. The people desiring 12 pointed out that if 12 slots were not set aside on the Bell Assembly line, some other customer could enter an order which might mean a two or more years wait. Their opponents argued vehemently that because of congressional problems we must make certain we have proof the Burmese intend to use them on narcotics targets (intelligence reports). Several votes were taken during this discussion and the preponderance was always on the side of the larger amount (the undersigned did not vote). Finally, the budget expert on Ambassador Vance's staff did some figures on a piece of paper and came up with the conclusion that no funds would be available to order the third group of six helicopters until after 01 January. The bitter discussion had been moot. Everyone wearily went home.

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